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The parallel exchange rate (whether official or unofficial) and
the resulting spread over the official exchange rate are primarily
determined by macroeconomic policies. Policymakers should
be cautious in adopting dual (ormultiple) exchange rate systems,
as they provide less insulation for domestic prices than most
analysts assume.
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Ghei and Kiguel empirically examine the  They cannot reject the hypothesis that there
determinants of the parallel exchange rate for a  are no differences in the determinants of the
cross-country sample of developiig countries.  spread when the parallel rate is official and
The sample includes countries in which the  unofficial. This is not entirely surprising, as in
parallel exchange rate is official (dual exchange  most cases where the parallel rate is unofficial, it
rate systems) as well as those in which it is  is largely tolerated by the authorities.
unofficial (black market).
In addition, although they cannot reject the
In the typical exchange rate arrangements  hypothesis that restrictions on the capital account
considered, the central bank fixes or pegs one  difect the spread, they find that restrictions on
rate (the commercial rate), used primarily for  the current account have no affect on it. These
current account transactions, and allows the  results are consistent with their prior finding that
parallel exchange rate, used for capital account  portfolio considerations dominate the determina-
transactions, to be market-determined.  tion of the parallel rate in the short run.
They base their empirical analysis on a  They find evidence that the adoption of dual
portfolio macroeconomic model in which the  exchange rate systems at best only partly insu-
parallel exchange rate is determined by expecta-  lates domestic priciq. This insulation may be
tions and equilibrium asset considerations in the  limited by three factors:
short run - but depends on the evolution of key
policy variables (such as the stock of money,  *  There may be a leakage of transactions from
budget deficits, and trade policy) in the long run.  the official to the parallel market.
The results indicate that macroeconomic  *  Depreciation of the parallel exchange rate
variables explain more than 70 percent (on  can enter inflationary expectations.
average) of the variation in the spread between
the official and parallel exchange rates. The  *  The spread might be an important factor
results are stronger for countries where the  when the central bank determines the rate of
spread is large (above 35 percent), somewhat  devaluation of the official exchange rate. Ghei
weaker in countries with moderate spreads  and Kiguel find empirical evidence supporting
(between 10 and 35 percent), and poor when the  this factor.
spread is below 10 percent.
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** *  The World Bank1. Introduction
Most  developing  countries  impo&e  restrictions  on  foreign  exchange  transactions,
especially  on  the  capital  account.  The  imposition  of  this  type  of  restrictions
generally  leads  to  the  emergence  of  a  parallel  foreign  exchange  market. Dual
exchange  rate  systems  are  one  way  of  introducing  these  restrictions.  In  that
system  there  are  two  officially  accepted  exchange  rates:  a  commercial  exchange
rate  for  current  account  transactions,  and  financial  exchange  rate  for  capital
account  transactions.  In  the  typical  arrangement  tke  commercial  exchange  rate
is  either  pegged  or  managed,  while  the  financial  exchange  rate  is  market
determined.  In  other  cases,  an  illegal  (or  blac'x)  parallel  market  develops  in
response  to  the  imposition  of  restrictions  to  operate  in  the  official  foreign
exchange  market  for  certain  trade  and  capital  transactions.
Official  dual  exchange  rates  are  typically  adopted  in  response  to  a  particular
macroeconomic  shock  (this  was  tho  case  for  both  Mexico  and  Venezuela  at  the
outbreak  of  the  debt  crisis).  Illegal  foreign  exchange  markets,  on  the  ot.qr
hand,  emerge  as  a  response  to  market  imbalances  caused  by  legal  restrictions  on
trade  and  capital  flows.  These  markets  vary  in  size,  depending  on  how  extensive
restrictions  are and the extent  to which the official  exchange  rate is
inconsistent  with  overall  macroeconomic  couditions.
The  principal  motivation  for  resorting  to  a dual  exchange  rate  system  is  to
protect  international  reserves  in  a balance  of  payments  crisis  without  resorting
to  maxi-devaluations,  which  can  be  inflationary.  By  adopting  this  system,  the
central  bank  can fix  the official  exchange  rate  and  yet avoid  any loss  in
reserves  from speculation  against  the domestic  currency  which is instead
channelled  to  the  parallel  foreign  exchange  market.  At  the  same  time,  domestic
prices  are  partly  insulated  (at  least  in  theory),  as  the  authorities  can  defend
the  fixed  exchange  rate  vhich  is  used  for  trade,  while  they  maintain  greater
control  of  the  money  supply.The  main  purpose  of  thie  paper  is  to  examine  empirically  the  determinants  of  the
spre&d  between  the  two  exchange  rates.  In  addition,  it  vill  examine  the  ability
of  the  syatem  to  insulate  domestic  prices  from  movements  in  the  parallel  exchange
rate. The  paper  will  look  at a large  sample  of developing  countries. 1 In
selecting  the  sample  of countries  we  made  two  important  decisionst  first,  we
study  together  countries  vith  official  and  unofficial  parallel  foreign  exchange
markets,  because  our  premise  was that  the  behavior  of the  parallel  rate  is
similar  in  both  casess  second,  we divided  the  sample  in  countries  with  high
premiums  on  the  one  hand,  and  low  and  moderate  premiums  on  the  other,  because  the
relationship  between  the  parallel  rate  and  the  fundamental  factors  affecting  it
are  expected  to  be  clearer  in  the  former  group.
In  this  paper  we  take  the  view  that,  especially  in  the  short  run,  the  parallel
exchange  rate  (and  hence  the  spread  between  both  exchange  rates)  is  primarily
determined  by the evolution  of macroeconomic  variables,  expectations  and
portfolio  considerations.  We  will  argue  that  this  view  is  useful  for  countries
in  which  the  parallel  exchange  rate  is  official  and for  those  in  which  is
illegal.
The  paper  will  be  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  sets  out  a  basic  portfolio
model  for  a  dual  exchange  rate  system,  which  is  based  in  Riguel  and  Lizondo(1990)
and  belongs  to  the  same  strand  of  thought  as  Dornbusch  et  al.  (1983)  and  Lizondo
(1987)  among  others. Section  III  presents  the  econometric  results  for  the
determinants  of the  parallel  premium  for  a  panel  of twenty  high  and  moderate
premium  (developing)  countries,  a4  vell  as  individual  estimations  for  twenty-one
countries. Section  IV investig  - the insulation  properties  of the dual
exchange  rate  system  of domestic  prices. In section  V we present  the  main
I  In  dual  exchange  rate  systems  the  parallel  market  is  official.  1n
most  cases,  however,  the  parallel  foreign  exchange  market  is  illegal  (black),
though  usually  tolerated.
2conclusions  of  this  paper  study  and  relate  them  to  other  works. 2
II. A  Modgl  fo a  Dual  Exchange  Rate  System
There  has  been  considerable  interest  in  the  functioning  of  dual  exchange  rate
markets  and  the  effect  of  their  presence  on  various  macroeconomic  variables.  Two
excellent  surveys  on the  existing  literature  have  recently  been  written  by
Lizondo  (1990)  and  Agenor  (1990a).  Analytical  models  for  parallel  markets  can
be  classified  into  the  following  four  categories  (Agenor,1990a):  smuggl'ng  and
real  tradelmodels,  the  monetary  approach,  portfolio  and  currency  substitution
models  and,  most  recent,  models  of  dutl  markets  with  leakages.
In  this  section  ye present  a portfolio  model  based  on Flood  (1978),  Lizondo
(1987)  and Kiguel  and Lizoneo  (1990),  which serves  as the basis  fo- the
cc.  nometric  estimations  presented  in  the  next  section.  The  model  assum'e.  a  small
open  economy  with  one  traded  good  and  one  non-traded  good. All commercial
transactions  take  place  at  the  official  rate  Eo,  which  crawls  at  a  rate  w.  All
financial  transaktions  take  place  at  the  parallel  rate  16,  which  is  determined
by  the  market.  Private  sector  nominal  wealth,  W,  is  t
PM+ER,F  (1)
where  M is  nominal  money  stock  and  F  is  the  stock  of foreign  assets  held  by
private  agents. Private  sector  consumption  of traded  and  non-traded  Soods
respectively  is
c,-aa  (m+fq  (2)
2  In  particular  we  will  compare  them  to  the  studies  for  Argentina
(Kamin(1991)],  Mexico  (Raminsky(1991)],  Sudan  [Elbadawi(1991))  and  Tanzania
(Kaufman  and  O'Connell(1990)J.  as  well  as  the  comparison  of  the  European  HER
arrangements  with  some  of  the  Latin  American  HERs  (Marion(1991)l  prepared  for
the  project  on  the  "Macroeconomic  Implications  of  Multiple  Exchange  Ratc
Systems,"  at  the  World  Bank.
3where  a  is  the  proportion  of  private  sector  expenditure  devoted  to  traded  goods,
m - MHEo  and  q  is  E1/EO,  the  parallel  premium.
c,-  (1-&)  a(m+qF) e  (3)
where  e-  EO/P  is  the  real  exchange  rate.
Government  consumption  of traded  and  non-traded  goods  is given  by 8s  and  gm
respretively.  Total  government  expenditure  is
g-g!*glJ  (4)
Equilibrium  in  the  non-traded  goods  market  requires
(  (1-a) a (m+qF)  +gd  ewy%  (5)
vhere  yp  is  the  value  of  output  in  the  sector.
Change  in  international  reserves  is  equal  to  the  current  account  balance
A-yr-aa  (m.qF  -gr  (6)
where  yT  is  the  value  of  traded  goods.
It  is  assumed  that  domestic  credit  creation  is  used  to  finance  the  public  sector
deficit  and  therefore  change  in  domestic  credit,D,  is
D-RO(9gt)  (7)
where  t  is  revenue  of  the  goverment. Combining  equations  6  and  7,  the  change
in  real  money  stock  is  given  by
lhuyT-sa  (maqF)  M+gr-  t-zia  (8)
The  composition  of  the  private  sector  portfolio  depends  on  the  expected  rate  of
depreciation  of  the  parallel  rate. Assuming  perfect  foresight,
4M-A (  ") qF=  I t (  ) +il]  qF,  (9)
which  describes  the  evolution  of  the  parallel  premium.  Setting
zhadrO,
we  obtain  the  following  steady  state  conditions,
aa (m+qF)  -yTgN-  t-xrm  (10)
and
(  QF)  s  ~~~~~~~~~~~(11)
and  the  steady  state  values  of  the  money  stock  and  parallel  premium  are
s=  I (  ) [y+qjr t]  (12)
&a  (I  (it) +I1]  J  ~:(s)
and
F aa El (x)  +1J  .A(w)  -13
These  stationary  equilibrium  solutions,  in  particular  the  one  for  the  parallel
premium  is the basis for the estimation  of the co-integration  and error
correction  equations  for  the  parallel  premium  in  Section  3.  These  solutions
suggest  the  following  general  relationship:
q'f(F,W,D)
where
5f 1<O,  4-?.  f3>0
A  larger  stock  of  foreign  assets  will  reduce  the  parallel  exchange  rate.  Higher
deficits  will  result  in  an  increase  in  the  level  of  the  parallel  premium.  In
addition,  in  the  short  run,  the  premium  will  be  affected  by  expectations  of  a
devaluation  on  the  official  exchange  rate,  or the  an appvoa?hing  balance  of
payments  crisis.
III. The  Em&irical  Estimation
The  model  presented  in  the  preceding  section  indicatee  that  the  size  of  the
parallel  premium  depends  on  the  consistency  between  monetary  policy  and  exchange
rate  policy,  expectations  of  devaluation  of  the  official  exchange  rate,  the  size
of  the  budget  deficit,  and  the  nature  and  scope  of  controls  in  the  current  and
capital  accounts  of  the  balance  of  payments.
For  estimation  purposes  we focused  primarily  on  certain  macro  variables.  In
particular,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  the  parallel  premium,  the  money
stock,  the  stock  of  international  reserves,  and  expectations  of  devaluation  of
the official  exchange  rate.  From  the preceding  discussion,  the following
hypotheses  were  formed. There  should  be a  positive  relationship  between  the
parallel  exchange  rate  and  the  money  stoc-,  as  postulated  by  simple  monetarist
models  (e.g.  Blejer  (1978).  The  relevant  definition  of  money  for  this  purpose
is  mainly  an  empirical  question,  and  we find  that  42 is  useful  in  most  caess.
Large  changes  ir  the  money  supply  which  are  not  accommodated  by  proportional
changes  in  the  official  exchange  rate  signal  inconsistent  macro  policies,  thus
leading  to  an  increase  in  the  premium.  Second,  falling  stocks  of  international
reserves  in  countries  with  limited  access  to  external  financing  could  signal  the
approach  of  a  balance  of  payments  crisis  which  would  cause  the  parallel  rate  to
depreciate  and  the  premium  to  increase.  Third,  expectations  of  devaluation  of
the  official  exchange  rate  in  the  immediate  future  should  lead  to  a  depreciation
6of  the  parallel  rate  and  an  increase  in  the  prsmiua.  T  some  cases,  devaluations
can  be  predicted  by  looking  at  the  evolution  of  the  real  official  exchange  rateg
a  strong  real  appreciation  could  indicate  that  a  devaluation  is  in  the  making.
The  deviation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  from  its  equilibrium  value  would  then
influence  the  level  of  the  parallel  premium.
a. Evidence  From  Individual  Countries
In  this  section  we will,  run  similar  regressions  explaining  the  premium  for  each
of  the  couptries  in  our  sample.  Given  that  the  macroeconomic  variables  that  we
use  are  liLely  to  evolve  along  similar  paths,  we first  test  for  cointegration.
The  parallel  premium  could  be  said  to  be  cointegrated  with  these  variables  in  the
sense  of  Engle  and  Granger  (1987).  For  the  following  expression,  where  q,  is  the
parallel  premium  and  F  is  the  vector  of  fundamentals,
lnq,-P'F  (14)
if both  qt,  and F  are first  difference  stationary,  then equation  (14)  is
integrated  of  order  zero,  and  hence  the  left  hand  side  describes  a  co-integration
relationship,  where  B is  the  cointegrating  vector.  The  equilibri-a  error  is
integrated  of order  zero  and hence  we can talk.  about  a stable  equilibrium
relationship  between  the  premium  and  the  fundamentals.  The  residual  from  the
cointegrating  equation  is  the  estimated  'error'.  The  error-correction  equation,
then,  provides  a  specification  for  the  short  run  dynamics  of  the  behavior  of  the
parallel  premium  and  has  the  following  representation:
Aqt.4  -B(RESD)  t+Ue  (15)
where  RESD is  the  residual  from the cointegration  equation  and ut  is  a
7disturbance  term. From  the  statistics  obtained  from  the  Dickey-Fuller  cestsl,
all  the  series  seem  to  be  first  difference  6tationary  for  the  sample  of  twenty-
one  countries  (see  appendix  ta'ole  2  for  the  list  of  countries  in  the  sample).
Therefore,  the  procedure  followed  for  estimating  the  cointegrating  relationship
would  seem  to  be  reasonable.
The following  specification  war eatimated  for  the  couutries  included  in  our
sample. Tu- fundamentals  chosen  were the broad  money,  stock  of nor.-gold
international  reserves,  deviation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  form  the  equilibrium
and  lagged  level  of  the  premium.
lnq,-B8+P 1 lnm,+F, 2 ±nR,+P 3AO,+P,lnq,-,e,  (16)
where  mn  is  broad  money  divided  by  the  official  exchange  rate,  R,  is  the  stock
of  non  gold  international  reserves  denominated  in  US  dollars,  Ae,  is  deviation
of  the  real  exchange  rate  form  its  equilibrium  value  and  ct  is  an  iid  error  term.
The  expected  signs  of  the  coefficients  are:
PO>°  P2<°  ,  2">0,=?
The  procedure  used  for  estimating  disequilibrium  of  the  real  exchange  rate  was
the  following.  The  real  exchange  rate,  et  was  defined  as:
e= Et.pe  (17)
'Pt
,here  Et  is  the  nominal  official  exchange  rate,  p'%  is  world  price  and  is  proxied
by the  US producer  price  index  and  p,  is  domestic  price,  using  the  domestic
consumer  price  index.  The  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  depends  on  a  number  of
fur'  mentals,  such as fiscal  and monetary  policy,  the terms of trade,
availability  and  size  of  foreign  financing  and  aid,  etc. Unfortunately,  these
'Results  of  the  Dickey-Fuller  tests  are  available  on  request.
8variables  are  not  available  for  majority  of  the  countries  in  our  sample  with  the
frequency  uaed  for  the  estimation.  Instead,  the  equltibrium  raal  exchange  rate
was  calculated  as  a  twelve  period  (quarter)  moving  average.  This  assumes  that
the  actual  real  exchange  rate  observed  during  a span  of three  years  roughly
correspends  to  the  equilibrium  one. The  difference  between  the  calculated  and
the  actual  real  exchange  rate  was  used  to  proxy  for  the  extent  of  disequilibrium
of  the  real  exchange  rate  at  any  point  in  time.
A  1n&-1n6,-1ne,  (18)
We  used  a  sample  of  twenty-one  developing  countries  for  which  quarterly  data  are
available.  In  turn,  we  divided  the  sample  between  countries  having  high  premia
(i.e.  in  e*zess  of  35  percent)  on  sverage,  and  moderate  premia  (i.e.  below  33
percent  on  average.  There  were  thirteen  countries  in  the  high  premium  group,  and
seven  experienced  premia  averaging  between  10  and  35  percent.  The  rationale  for
this division  is that  we et,ect  the relationship  between  the premium  and
macroeconomic  variables  would  be  clearer  in  high  premium  countries  than  in  the
countries  with  moderate  premia.  In  addition,  high  premium  countries  were  also
subject  to  larger  macroeconomic  imbalances.  For  most  countries  estimation  was
for  the  sample  period  was  1970  to  1990  using  quarterly  data.  All  data  are  from
the  IFS  tapes  except  the  parallel  exchange  rate  which  are  obtained  from  various
issues  of the  World  Currency  Yearbook,  Pick's  Currency  Yearbook  and  Currency
Alert.  Periods  when  the  exchange  rate  was  unified  were  excluded.'  Dumaies  were
used  for  Bolivia,  DUMMY1  for  the  period  of  the  hyperinflation,  DUMMY2  for  the
period  following.  In  some  cases,  lagged  values  of  the  variables  were  used  with
or  instead  of  the  curren;  values Lagged  money  was  used  in  the  case  of  Tanzania,
4 For  Argentina,  this  means  excluding  the  period  from  the  last  quarter
of  1976  to  the  end  of  1980.  The  period  from  the  last  quarter  of  1977  to  the
second  quarter  of  1981  Was  excluded  from  the  regression  for  Chile  (1970-1990).
For  Colombia,  this  meant  excluding  the  period  from  the  third  quarter  of  1977
to  the  second  quarter  of  1981  and  for  Ecuador  it  extended  from  the  thirc!
quarter  of  1973  to  the  end  of  1974.  In  the  case  of  Venezuela,  estimation  was
only  for  the  period  1983  to  1989.  For  Mexico,  the  period  was 1976  to  1987.
Dual  exchange  arrangements  were  in  place  in  these  countries  for  only  the
stated  periods.
9Zambia,  Kenya  and  Pakistan  in  the  cointegration  equation.  The  lagged  value  real
exchange  rate  variable  was  used  for  Ethiopia,  Argentina,  Bolia  and  Brazil.  We
found  lagged  change  in  money  to  be  appropriate  for  the  error-correction  equation
for  Pakistan.  For  most  cases  we included  a lagged  dependent  variable  for  the
cointegration  equation  (with  Ghana,  Tanzania,  Zambia,  Argentina,  Bolivia,  the
Dominican  Republic  and  Peru  being  the  exceptions).  This  lagged  variable  was  also
included  in some  of the  cases  for  the  error-correction  equation  (including
Ethiopia,  Venezuela,  Turkey and Colombia,  among others).  The precise
specification  of  the  estimated  equations  differs  slightly  for  each  country,  but
the fundamentals  are the same.  The results  of the estimations  for the
cointegration  and  error-correction  equations  are  reported  in tables  1  and  2
respectively.
10Table  1.  DETRMIANTS  OF  Te  LEVEL OF  TEE  PARALLEL PREMUM
Dependent  variable  LPREE,1
ocountry  Constant  Ll
2
0  UT20t 1 LUESVDt  LuESvD0t1 lEtt  BEUt1 PEE,  R  Dw  DP  ADi4
Higb  Premium  CountriesC
Egpt  -0.93  0.14  -0.08  2.12  .J8
(-2.43)  (1.67)  (-0."6)  (4.01)  (12.84)  0.86  1.48  -6.27  2.00
Ethiopia  -3.02  0.31  0.15  -0.51  0.60
(-2.3S)  (2.38)  (1.45)  (-1.19)  (9.26)  0.79  1.88  -8.31  A
Gbans  -13.29  1.40  0.72  0.10
(-7.74)  (7.92)  (3.21)  (6.92)  0.77  1.53  -6.41  -3.16
Nigeria  -1.89  0.32  .0.16  0.56  0.58
(-2.33)  (3.40)  (-2.66)  (3.56)  (7.21)  0.81  2.14  -8.92  -3.11
Tanzania  0.47  0.14  -0.27  0.43
(0.43)  (1.14)  (-3.40)  (2.18)  0.39  0.66  -3.60  -2.86
Zmble  1.35  -0.20  0.003  0.24  0.91
(0.97)  (-1.20)  (0.03)  (2.32)  (13.07)  0.77  1.96  -8.07  .3.46
Argentina  -6.06  1.26  -0.90  0.19
(-1.98)  (3.24)  (-4.97)  (0.27)  0.31  1.92  -6.91  -3.02
Bolivia,  -1.53  1.04  -1.44  2.55
(-1.34)  (3.17)  (-5.87)  (2.00)  0.69  1.28  -4.89  -2.68
Brazil  -2.67  0.29  -0.004  290.11  0.54
(-0.72)  (0.41)  (-0.01)  (0.94)  (4.70)  0.29  1.90  -6.97  -1.90
Chile  -6.89  2.21  -1.63  0.003  0.37
(-2.45)  (3.09)  (-3.36)  (0.24)  (2.28)  0.72  1.49  -3.53  -1.27
Dominican  -6.49  1.43  -0.98  0.71
Republlc  (.5.13)  (5.73)  (-5.64)  (2.69)  0.49  0.70  -3.47  -1.96
Peru  -14.6t  2.45  -0.94  0.11
(-3.09)  (3.38)  (-2.78)  (0.54)  0.48  0.73  -2.91  -1.81
Venezuela  .11.23  1.39  -0.28  0.08  0.32
(-3.39)  (2.72)  (-0.8)  (1.44)  (3.31)  0.73  0.76  -1.69  -1.54
Soderato  Prerum  Countries 
Colobia  -4.31  1.01  0.74  0.03  0.37
(-1.85)  (2.12)  (-2.51)  (1.21)  (5.16)  0.61  2.32  -9.06  -2.68
Ecudor  -3.46  0.74  -0.38  0.02  0.79
(.3.31)  (3.12)  (-2.42)  (2.11)  (13.23)  0.91  1.64  -6.15  -4.68
India  -1.71  0.07  -0.06  .0.04  0.17
(-0.77)  (0.19)  (-0.18)  (-0.15)  (1.44)  -0.02  2.06  -8.65  -3.77
ea  1.03  0.05  -0.37  0.10  0.60
(0.98)  (0.41)  (-1.84)  (1.14)  (5.77)  0.54  1.86  -7.46  -2.60
Henlco  -7.39  0.52  0.1i  -0.001  0.83
(-1.64)  (1.48)  (1.02)  (-0.32)  (9.46)  0.72  2.55  -8.99  -3.12
Pakistan  1.64  -0.30  0.04  0.18  0.55
(1.16)  (-1.53)  (0.20)  (2.70)  (5.69)  0.47  1.99  -8.07  -3.44
Turkey  -9.45  3.99  -4.34  -0.003
(-0.60)  (2.51)  (-2.61)  (-0.12)  0.12  2.33  -3.62  -1.52
Uruguay  -0.07  0.16  -0.37  0.03  0.55
(-0.08)  (0.74)  (-2.19)  (2.72)  (5.98)  0.70  1.98  -5.20  -1.99
11Tabl  2.  M0  C03CIO  10  TM  FARM=  PRM
Dependent  variable  DMtE1
Country  Res"Ral.  p  W20 1 SDN+l  O+1  Egt  i  DW
Bflb  Premim  Countries
4gpt  0.-0  0.97  -0.07  3.27  0.24
(1.54)  (2.02)  (-0.78)  (5.09)  (1.50)  0.59  2.02
Etiopia  1.16  -0.84  0.05  -1.32  0.69
(3.21)  (-P.")  (0.29)  (-2.50)  (2.62)  0.19  1.92
Ghana  0.64  -0.4"  0.09  0.15
(6.54)  (-1.27)  (0.24)  (16.33)  0.66  1.65
Niger"  0.87  0.75  -0.09  O."  0.31
(4.4)  (1.81)  (-0.57)  (2.14)  (1.95)  0.43  1.96
Tanznia  0.34  0.26  0.06  0.03
(3.81)  (0.56)  (0.64)  (1.45)  0.30  2.09
Zambla  1.21  0.71  .0.07  0.12  1.10
(2.93)  (1.43)  (-0.59)  (0.67)  (2.64)  0.13  1.97
Argentina  0.96  1.11  -0.96  6.51
(4.60)  (2.37)  (-2.55)  (0.91)  0.49  1.99
3011,1  0.42  1.38  -0.32  -0.42
(3.31)  (2.19)  (-1.14)  (-0.26)  0.33  2.34
Urauil  0."9  2.42  -1.10
(2.76)  (2.55)  (-1.67)  0.19  2.04
Chile  0.50  1.16  -2.78  0.05
(2.38)  (0.69)  (-5.03)  (2.51)  0.59  2.02
Donican
lep,btlc  0.25  -0.17  1.09
(3.27)  (.1.67)  (5.96)  0.36  2.09
poru  0.24  1.77  .0.60
(2.53)  (2.73)  (-1.02)  0.16  1.63
Venezuela  0.32  1.93  -O.48  0.03  0.27
(1.41)  (2.56)  (-0.84)  (0.40)  (2.66)  0.77  1.90
Moderate  Psdur  CoustriUs
Columbia  0.56  0.20  -0.74  0.07
(4.16)  (0.10)  (-1.00)  (1.64)  0.26  2.32
Ecuador  0.96  0.03  1.02
(4.04)  (4.66)  (4.65)  0.33  1.69
India  0.63  3.65  -1.64  -0.21
(6.76)  (1.24)  (-1.50)  (-0.62)  0.43  1.98
MenYa  0.89  -1.63  -0.35  0.17  0.53
(3.19)  (-1.54)  (-1.13)  (1.60)  (2.15)  0.17  2.06
mbmio  0.50  0.54  .0.80  -0.001
(3.36)  (0.")  (-2.02)  (.0.29)  0.23  1.92
Pokaitan  0.32  2.11  0.26
(4.39)  (2.92)  (4.06)  0.34  1.74
Turkey  0.09  2.24  .0.62  0.006  -0.58
(1.21)  (2.3)  (-1.A8)  (1.43)  (.4.26)  0.44  2.26
Uuguay  0.78  0.005  0.80  0.02  .0.30
(3.29)  (0.004)  (-2.29)  (1.15)  (-1.65)  0.34  2.2'Notes  for  Tables  1  and  2:
Source:  IFS,  World  Currency  Yearbook,  and  Currency  Analysis  (various  issues)
Data are  quarterly  end  of period.
Figures  in parentheses  are  t-statistice
Variables:
LPRE:  ln(premium)
LM20:  ln(Money/Officlal  Exchange  Rate)
LRESVD:  ln(non-gold international  reserves)
RER:  Deviation  of real  exchange  rates  from  equilibrium
DPREt change  in  ln(premium)
DM20:  change  in  ln(Money/Official  Exchange  Rate)
DRESVD: change  in  ln(non-gold  international  reserves)
DRER:  change  in  RER
Statistics:
DF:  Dickey-Fuller
ADF:  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller
DW: Durbin-Watson
l:  The  cointegration  equation  for  Bolivia  included  the following  dumnies:
DUMMYl:  3.41(10.30)  for  the  period  of the  hyperinflation.
DMIMY2:  -1.97(-3.87)  for  the  periof  following  the  hyperinflation.As may be expected,  the  results  are clearer  and stronger  for  the high  premium
countries.  Money  stock  has  the  expected  sign  for  all  high  premium  countries  and
is  significant for most.  The  coefficients obtained for  the  level of
international  reserves  are  negative  for  nine  of  the  thirteen  of  the  high  premium
countries  and  is  statistically  significant  at  the  5  percent  level  for  most. The
level  of international  reserves  is not  statistically  significant  for  the  cases
where  the  coefficient  has  a  positive  value,  with  Ghana  being  the  sole  exception.
The  coefficient  obtained  for  the  term  representing  deviations  from  equilibrium
of the real exchange  rates has the expected  sign for all the high premium
countries  andis statistically  significant  for the majority.  The R' and the
Durbin-Watson  statistic  are quite good, though the presence of the lagged
dependent  variable  term  does  bias the  Durbin-Watson  towards  a  value  of 2.  The
Dickey-Fuller  as  well as  the  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests  strongly  support  the
hypothesis  of cointegration,  with the exception  of Venezuela.  However,  the
period  under  consideration  for  Venezuela  is  extremely  short  (six  years)  and  the
weakness  of the  Dickey-Fuller  test  statistic  is to  be expected.
The results are not quite so strong for the moderate premium countries.
Excluding  Pakistan,  the  coefficient  for  the  money  stock  has  the  expected  sign  for
all  the  moderate  premium  countries  in the  sarple. The  money stock  is  positive
though  not  significant  for  India,  Kenya,  Mexico  and  Uruguay;  it is  negative  but
not statistically  significant  for  Pakistan. The  coefficient  for  international
reserves  has the expected  sign for six of the moderate  premium countries,
Pakistan and Mexico being the exceptions.  However, the coefficient  for
international  reserves  is not significant  for either  country;  neither is it
statistically  significant  for India  or Kenya,  even though  it has the expected
sign.  The results  for the real exchange  rate term are more mixed, but the
coefficient  has  the  expected  sign  for  every  case  it  is  statistically  significant.
Cointegration  is supported  for  most of the countries,  but the result  of the
augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test is  ambiguous  for  Kenya,  Turkey  and  Uruguay.
The error-correction  equation  is a flexible  specification  of the short run
dynamics. The residual  from the  cointegration  equation  measures  the 'error',that is,  the  extent  of  disequilibrium  in  the  market. Regressing  the  change  in
the parallel premium on last period'o residual  yields an estimate of the
correction  in the  'error'. In this  case,  the  residual  term  captures  the  short-
run impact  of the  portfolio  factors  that  were used  as the fundamentals  in the
cointegration  equation.  In most  cases we  expanded the  error-correction
specification  to include  the first  difference  of the fundamentals,  the  money
stock,  level  of international  reserves  and the  real exchange  rate  variable  as
well as a lagged  value  of the  dependent  variable.
The  results  of  the  error  correction  equations  are,  in  general,  quite  good,  even
for  the  moderate  premium  countries. They indicate  that  the  short  run  behavior
of the  premium  is  primarily  influenced  by portfolio  considerations  and changes
in  variables  such  as  the  money  stock  and  the  level  of  international  reserves  are
important. The residual  'error-correction'  term  is  positive  for  all countries
and  statistically  significant,  with the  exception  of  Egypt  and  Venezuela  in  the
sample  of high premium  countries  and  Turkey  in the  sample  of moderate  premium
countries  . While  the  weakness  of the  results  for  the  case  of Venezuela  are  to
be expected,  given the brevity ef the period  with dual exchange  rates,  the
results  for  Egypt  and  Turkey  are  puzzling. It  is  possible  that  the  results  would
improve  with  the  inclusion  of  other,  country  specific  variables. In most  cases
the  coefficient  of the  error-correction  term  is less  than 1,  providing  support
for  the  hypothesis  of  stable  dynamics. The  exceptions  are  Ethiopia  and  Zambia,
both countries  subject  to extensive  controls. Zambia  was subject  to various
terms of trade shocks  thr  ugh the period  under consideration  and underwent
several regime  changes.  Elbadawi  and Aron(1991)  include a terms of trade
variable  as  well  as  regime  change  dummies  in  their  estimation  and  do  not  find  any
evidence  of  unstable  dynamics.  Since  this  paper  is  concerned  more  with  providing
results  across  a broad  spectrum  of countries,  rather  than  detailed  results  for
an individual  country,  we prefer  not to expand  our specification  for  country-
specific  features.
In several  cases  the  evolution  in  the  money  stock  is  relevant  and  statistically
significant  in the determination  of the short run behavior  of the parallel
premium.  This includes  high permium countries,  such as Egypt, Argentina,Bolivia,  Brazil,  Peru  and  Venezuela,  as  well  as  moderate  premiL-  countries,  such
as Pakistan  and  Turkey. The  change  in international  reserves  is statistically
significant  in  the  cases  of  Argentina,  Chile,  Mexico  and  Uruguay. The  change  in
the disequilibrium  of the rea1 exchange  rate has a postive and significent
coefficient  for Egypt,  Ghana,  Nigeria,  Chile,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador  and
Pakistan.  The results  obtained  tend to support the view that the parallel
premium  exhibits  very  similar  behavior  acrcas  the  sample,  regardless  of  country-
specific  features  in the  dual exchange  rate arrangements. Further,  portfolio
factors  dominate  the  behavior  of the  parallel  premium  in the  short  run  in  both
high  and  moderate  premium  countries.
Our results are broadly in agreement  with tnose obtained in more detailed
individual  country  studies  on the  determinants  of the  parallel  exchange  rate.
Most  of these  studies  include  a  variable  measuring  the  deviation  from  parity  of
the  domestic  interest  rate from  the  world interest  rate.  Theory  suggests  that
interest  rate  differentials  are  an  important  factor  in  determining  exchange  rates
and should  be relevant in determining  the parallel  premium.  However, the
countries  in  our  sample  differ  substantially  in  availability  of  data  on  domestic
interest  rates  and the reliability  of such  data.  Many of them h-ave  repressed
financial  systems  and  it  would  be extremely  difficult  to obtain  any reasonable
estimate  of interest  rates  that  would  be consistent  across  the  sample  and  over
the time period  under consideration. In some of the country studies,  the
specification  is expanded  to include  variables  such  as terms  of trade  and  tax
rates on exports  and imports  as well as dummies  for regime  shifts.  These
refinements  improve the results obtained in these studies.  However, the
essential  results  obtained  do not  contradict  the  results  obtained  here.
Kamin(1991)  finds  evidence  of  cointegration  between  the  parallel  premium  and  the
macroeconomic fundamentals  for Argentina (the fundamentals  used  are  the
commercial  exchange  rate,  domestic  prices,  real  GDP,  dollar  export  price,  dollar
import  price  as  well  as  tariff  rates). Money  and  the  domestic  interest  rate  are
included  in  the  estimation  for  the  short  run  portfolio  relationships.  Portfolio
factors  are  important  in the  determination  of the  parallel  premium  in the  short
run in Argentina  according  to Kamin,  which is the  result  we obtain.  He alsofinds  no evidence  to support  insulation  due  to the  dual  exchange  rate  system  in
the  case  of  Argentina,  which  is  in  line  with  what  we find  (see  Section  4,  tables
4 and  5).  Kaufman  and  O'Connell  estimate  a single  equation  incorporating  both
long  run  trade  variables  as  well as short  run portfolio  factors  for  Tanzania.
They  find  that  the empirical  evidence  supports  the  relevance  of both trade  and
portfolio  factors  in  determining  the  behavior  of  the  parallel  premium. Portfolio
factors,  in  particular,  seem  to important  in  the  short  run. Hausmann  adapts  the
basic Kiguel-Lizondo  framework  to incorporate  the  instability  inherent in
Venezuela  during  the period  from 1983 to 1988  when a multiple  exchange  rate
system  was  adopted. Ansu includes  in  the  cocoa  smuggling  that  is  important  for
the  parallel  market  in  Ghana.  Phylaktis(1992)  uses a  variant  of the  Dornbusch
model and a cointegration-error  correction  approach  to examine the parallel
market  in Chile, allowing  specifically  for foreign  exchange  restrictions  on
international  trade  and  capital  transactions.  The results  obtained  in  most of
these  studies  tend  to support  the  relevance  of  portfolio  factors  in  determining
the  short  run  behavior  of the  parallel  premium. Trade  factors,  such  as tariffs
and  quotas  as  well as  macroeconomic  variables,  including  the  real  exchange  rate
and  the  money stock  help determine  the  long  run  behavior  of the  premium.
our work can also shed some light on the puzzling results presented in
Marion(1991).  She  finds  that  for  Belgium,  France  and  Italy,  the  premium  does  not
respond  to  changes  in  domestic  fiscal  policy,  while  it  is  negatively  correlated
to  the  money  stock. According  to  her  paper,  the  premium  is  best  explained  by  the
dollar/domestic  currency  interest  rate  differential.  Her  explanation  is  that  the
parallel  exchange  rate  in the  European  economies  responds  to different  factors
than  in  Latin  America.
In our view, the main reason  for the dissimilar  results is the size of the
premium. The  Earopean  countries  in fact  had  very  low  premia  (it  rarely  exceeded
10 percent),  certainly  much smaller  than most countries  in Latin  America,  or
Africa  (with  premiums  exceeding  100  percent). As we discussed  in the  previous
section,  the  relationship  between  the  premium  and  the  fundamentals  is  much  weaker
(in  the sense  that it is  more difficult  to capture  it ecorometrically)  in the
former  group.  Thus, the inability  to explain the premium in the Europeancountries  is probably  more related  to econometric  difficulties  than to the
inappropriateness  of the  analytical  framework.
b.  Additional  Cross  Country  Evidence
We also  estimated  a single  equation  for  the  level  of  the  parallel  premium  using
annual  data  from  a  panel  of  twenty  high  premium  countries.  The  objective  of  this
exercise  was  to evaluate the robustness  of the  results obtained for the
individual  countries,  and to investigate  whether there are any behavioral
difference  in countries  (or  periods)  where parallel  markets are official  and
those  where  they  are  not. In addition,  we looked  in  a  crude  way at  the  relative
importance  of restrictions  in the  capital  and  current  account  cn the  pre,...,
We use a random  effects  procedure  as set out in Hausman and Taylor(1981)  to
account for unobservable,  country-specific  effects.  Since this requires  a
balanced  panel,  a dummy  was introduced  for  the  period  when exchange  rates  were
unified  in the countries  in the sample. The fundamentals  used  were the  real
money stock and the fiscal  surplus to GDP ratio.  We  included  four dummy
variables  to  account  for  countries  or  periods  in  which:  (i)  the  foreign  exchange
market  was unified,  (ii) the parallel  market  was official,  (iii,  there  were
restrictions  in  the  current  account,  (iv)  there  were restrictions  in  the  capitalTable  3s  Panel  Estimation  for  the  Level  of the  Parallel  Premium
Dependent  Variables  LPRE,
Regressor  Version  1  Version  2  Version  3
Constant  0.62  0.66  -0.50
(5.87)  (6.07)  (-1.78)
LRMOt-0  0.24  0.22  0.22
(2.61)  (2.47)  (2.61)
FSURt  -0.36  -0.35  -0.47
(-2.28)  (-2.19)  (-3.07)
DUMHYU  -3.24  -3.17  -3.19
(-7.77)  (-7.72)  (-6.86)
DUMMYO  |  --  -0.50  0.17
(-1.53)  (0.48)
RESCUR  --  --  -0.06
(-0.15)
RESCAP  --  1.26
(2.89)
0.26  0.27  0.37
DW  1.40  1.43  1.52
Notes:
LRMO:  M2/E(1+6GNP)(1+6P*),  PSUR:  Fiscal  Surplus/GNP
DUMMYU:  Dummy  for  periods  of  unified  exchange  rates,  DUMMYO:  Duymm  for  official
dual exchange  rate system.
RESCUR:  Restrictions  on  payments  on the  current  account,1RESCAPt  Restrictions  on
payments  on the  capital  account.
Annual  data 1976-1988. List  of countries  in the  panel  is in  Appendix  Table 1.
Source: IFS, World Currency Yearbook, Exchange Arrangements and  Exchange
Restrictions  (various  issues),  RAL-2.account.
The  coefficients  all  have  the  expected  sign. Higher  money stock  has  a positive
effect  on the level  of the parallel  premium.  A smaller  budget  surplus (or  a
higher  budget  deficit) will  result in  a  higher  parallel premium.  A
unifiedexchange  rate  is  expected  to  drive  the  parallel  premium  down  (to  zero)  and
hence  the  coefficient  for  DUMMYU  is  negative.  When  the  dual  exchange  rate  system
is official,  the element  of risk  involved  in trading  on the  parallel  market  no
longer  exists  and  the  premium  should  be smaller. We find  that  the coefficient
for  DUMHYO  is  negative  but statistically  insignificant.  We also estimated  the
same  equation  with dummies  for  restrictions  on payments  on the  current  account
and the capital account t RESCUR  and RESCAP respectively 5).  The dummy for
restrictions  on payments  on the  capital  account  is statistically  significant,
while  the  dummy  for  restrictions  on  payments  on the  current  account  is  not. The
coefficient  obtained  for  RESCAP  is  somewhat  large,  but  this  could  be due  to  the
nature  of the (0,1)  dummy  being  used.  The  sign of the  coefficient  for  DUMMYO
changes  but is still  statistically  insignificant.
We can  conclude  from  these  results  that  it  makes  little  difference  to  the  level
of  the  parallel  premium  whether  the  dual  exchange  rate  system  is  official  or  not.
The evolution  of monetary  aggregates  and the fiscal  surplus  are found to be
important  in determining  the parallel  exchange  rate.  This corroborates  the
findings  of the  previous  section. In  addition,  the  results  broadly  support  the
view that restrictions  on the capital  account  have a significant  effect in
increasing  the  premium  while  restrictions  on the  current  account  do not appear
to  matter. While this  is  consistent  with  more casual  empirical  evidence  (i.e.
in  countries  with no capital  controls  there  is  no premium),  the  results  should
be taken  with some caution  because  the  variable  that  we constructed  does not
measure  the  intensity  of cortrols.
IV.  Insulation  Properties  on the  Official  Exchange  Rate and  Domestic  Prices
5  The dummies  were constructed  using  information  from "Exchange
Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions  (IMF,  various  issues)One  of the  reasons  that  lead  countries  to adopt  dual  and  multiple  exchange  rate
systems  is to insulate  domestic  prices  from short  term  changes  in the  parallel
exchange  rate. This  is  achieved  by  fixing  the  official  exchange  rate  and  keeping
it as a nominal anchor  for prices.  The ability  to insu_.ate  domestic  prices
depends  on the following  two considerationss  first,  that the authorities  in
effect  set  the  official  exchange  rate  independently  of  the  level  of the  parallel
exchange  rate,  and  second,  that  there  are  no  leakages  of  transactions  between  the
official  and  the  parallel  market. The  more  actively  the  authorities  intervene
to close  the  spread  between  the  two  rates,  the  closer  these  two  rates  will  move
together  and  hence  the smaller  will be the insulation  provided  by the system.
Likewise,  to  the  extent  that  the  parallel  exchange  rate  becomes  the  marginal  cost
for  imports,  and/or  the  marginal  revenue  for  exports  (e.g.  because  of  smuggling),
domestic  prices  will be  more  closely  affected  by the  parallel  exchange  rate  and
insulation  will be smaller.
In  this  section  we  will  examine  empirically  the  insulation  properties  of  dual  and
multiple  exchanger  rate  systems  in  the  two  ways  described  above.  We will first
examine  the  extent  to  which  the  authorities  take into  account  the level  of the
premium  in  setting  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  official  rate  and  we  will  then
turn  to look  at the  direct  effect  of the  parallel  rate  on domestic  prices.
a.  The  Impact  of the  Spread  in  Setting  the  Rate of  Devaluation
One  way to examine  whether  the  authorities  take into  account  the  effect  of the
spread  in setting  the  rate of devaluation  of the official  exchange  rate is to
estimate  an equation  of the following  form,
AE,e=&j AERO 0o+s 2AFO'  +&3qt  qt:-28)
where  E.  is the  nominal  official  exchange  rate and  q is the  parallel  premium.
The  more  the  rate  of  devaluation  in  the  current  period  depends  on  the  size  of  the
premium  in  the  previous  periods,  the  smaller  the  insulation  the  system  provides.
We estimated  this  equation  for  a  sample  of  twelve  developing  countries. In  manycases  the  second  lag  was  excluded.'  The  period  of  estimation  was 1970  to  1990
for  most countries 7.
The  results  of the  estimation  are  presented  in  table  4.  In every  case  the
coofficient  for  the  last  quarter  premium  term  was  statistically  significant.  The
value  of  the  coefficient  obtained  varied  across  the  sample.  It  exceeded  1  only
in the case of  Argentina, and hence it is possible that there was  some
overshooting  in  the  devaluation  in  the  official  rate. In  six  cases  the  size  of
the  coefficient  obtained  is  very  small,  less  than  0.10. For  the  remaining  five
cases  the  coefficient  varied  between  0.10  and  0.50.  It  would  seem  that  the  level
of  the  parallel  premium  is  a  significant  factor  in  determining  the  timing  of  the
devaluation.  The  size  of  the  devaluation,  however,  would  depend  on  the  premium
as  well  as  other  factors.
These  results  indicate  that  the  authorities  did  ta&e  into  account  the  spread
between  the  two  exchange  rates  in  setting  the  devaluation  of  the  official  rate.
In  this  respect  the  system  did  not  provide  the  insulation  that  it  was  supposed
'  Second  quarter  lagged  devaluation  of  the  official  rate  was  included
for  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil  and  Chile.  The  fourth  quarter  lag  was  included
as  well  for  Brazil.  Second  quarter  lagged  premium  was  included  in  the
estimation  for  Egypt,  Tanzania  and  Mexico.  Since  Mexico  had  a  crawling  peg  for
the  period  under  consideration,  a  constant  term  was  included  in  the
estimation.
'  The  period  for  Argentina  and  Mexico  was  first  quarter,1982  to  fourth
quartor,1989.  Estimation  for  Venezuela  was  fourth  quarter,  1982  to  fourth
quarter,  1989.  The  period  of  unified  exchange  rates  was  excluded  for  Chile
(fourth  quarter,  1977  to second  quarter,  1981)Table  4t  Devaluation  of  the  Official  Exchange  Rate
Dependent  Variables  D0UR
Country  DODZRt  W  tl2  wNt4  PROk.1  R 2 2  IDV
Nigh ?resdim  comitias
Argentina0.45  -0.26  1.  06  0.51  1.66 Argzentin  (3.04)  (-1.73)  (5.91)
olvia  0.06  0.09  0.27  0.69  2.17
(0.96)  (1.30)  (11.42)
Brasil  0.49  -0.19  0.39  0.'0  0.74  2.01
(5.04)  (-1.97)  (4.45)  (5.92)
Chile  0.  0.17  0.02  0.26  2.34
(2.06)  (1.67)  (5.53)
Demnidcan  Rep.  .0.03  0.12  0.  1)  1.96
(.0.27)  (4.60)
Egpt  0.19  0t11  -0.09  0.06  2.03
(1.16)  (2.17)  (-1.70)
hana  0.03  0.01  0.10  1.98
(0.26)  (3.91)
Nigeria.  0.40  0.02  0.21  1.92
(4.02)  (2.72)
Peru  0.32  0.24  0.45  1.7$
(4.12)  (7.68)
Tanzaia  ,  0.30  0.09  -0.07  0.34  1.96
(2.47)  (6.04)  (-3.93)
V  1^WAOU  I  .0.05  0.08  2.02 (  .i0.30)  (2.73)
Zambia  I0.003  0.02  0.03  2.03
1(0.03)  (3.41)
Moderate PrF  Comtriest
Colombia  0.90  0.04  0.75  1.96
(20.90)  (2.23)
94uado2  0.221  0.12  0.37  2.09
(2.46)  (4.09)
OeXIC0
2 0.15  0.42  -0.33  0.26  1.48
(0.91)  (3.64)  (-2.65)
Turkey  014  0.46  0.26  1.71
(1.40)  (7.674)
Source  US.  World Curreny  Yearbook. Pick's  Currency Yearbook.  Pain(1991)  for  Argentina.
Data  r  qurterly,  nd  of  period  for  1970-1990.  ecept  for  Argentina,  Mexco  and Ven  eula  (*ee text  for  deteils).  The period  for  unified
exchange rates  to  excluded for  Chie.
4Piures  o  parentheses  arm t-s*atUtice
DQUs  Dwalatin  In  the  official  exchange rate.
PI  IWs  Parallel  Nate/Offioiel  Pate  - 1.
Is  DOI
2.  Equaton  for  Kexio  itnlude,  a conatant  torm with  va  0.10(2.57)to  provide. It  probably  allowed  the  authorities  to  postpone  devaluation  in  some
circumstances,  and in  this  way do  not  accommodate  fully  changes  in the  parallel
exchange  rate. However,  on the  whole  this insulation  was at  best partial.
b.  Insulation  on Domestic  Prices
A second  way  to examine  the  ability  of the  dual  exchange  rate  system  to insulate
domestic  prices  is to estimate  directly  the relationship  between  the  parallel
exchange  rate  and domestic  prices. In an open economy  in  which all goods  are
tradeable  domestic  prices  should  roughly  follow  purchasing  power  parity  (adjusted
for tariffs  and other restrictions  to trade, transport  costs, etc.).  The
relevant exchange rate for the purchasing  power calculation  is mainly an
empirical  question  which to a large  extent  depends  on the  ability  of agents  to
circumvent  existing  restrictions.  Chhibber  and  Shafik  (1990)  argue  that  in  the
case of Ghana the parallel  exchange  rate played a key role in determining
domestic  prices.
The way we proceed  in this section  is to look directly  at the relationship
between  changes  in  domestic  prices  and  in the  parallel  rate. In particular,  we
estimate  the following  specification  for  the  same  sixteen  countries  as before:
A'Pt=Y1AZV.+Y2ARB,>^.  (19)
where  P is  domestic  CPI  and  E,  is  the  nominal  parallel  exchange  rate. The  period
of  estimation  is  identical  to  that  used  for  the  previous  estimation.  Since  there
are  problems  of  multicollinearity,  an instrumental  variables  procedure  was  used
in the  estimation. Instruments  used included  lags  of the depreciation  in the
parallel  rate  and  lagged  (in  some  cases,  current)  rate  of  change  in  money  stock.
Results  from  the  estimation  are  reported  in  Table  5. In  every  case,  we find  that
the  coefficient  for  depreciation  in  the  parallel  rate  is statisticallyTable  St  The  Inulation  Equation
Dependet  Variables  XU1.
Country  DSUB  DDCI-  DW  Q
31gh  Pr  uw  Comtrdss
Argentina  0.71  0.31  2.00  2.50
Bolivia  1.74  0.37  2.34  15.49
Brarfl  0.i793  0.20  1.78  20.92
(7.04)  (2.13)
Chile  0.44  0.05  2.11  6.21
(2.93)  0.44)
Domnien  Republic  0.81  0.15  1.40  31.63
(2.49)  (1.12)
ypt  0.67  0.13  1.77  27.90
(2.56)  (1.26)
Ghana  0.47  0.17  1.57  36.67
(2.05)  (2.35)
Nieria  (0.64  0.1  6  1.98  14.40
Nigeria  ~~~~~~  ~  ~~(2.12)  (1.69)
Peru  0.96  0.18  1.61  62.14
(6.80)  (Z.70)
Tazania  0.59  0.11  1.98  25.99
(2.05)  (1.50)
Venezela  0.83  -0.18  1.56  9.42
(1.91)  (-0.76)
ZEmbia  0.31  0.14  1.45  37.96
(3.31)  (2.88) ~drate  Pr_.  Coomtriaas
Colambia  0.69  0.24  1.24  76.49
(4.66)  (2.73)
eador  0.80  1.39  45.17
(4.71)
mexco  0.67  0.21  1.37  8.65
(3.36)  (1.65)
Tntkey  0.73  0.29  1.94  39.20
(5.60)  (4.20)
Notes$
Soarces  It8  World Currecy  Yearbook.  Pick's  Currecy  earbook.  Kaoin(1991)  for  Argentia.
Data are quarterly, ed  of  period  for  1970-1990,  *zeept  for  Argentin.  Mexco  and Venesla  (oco  tex.  for  details).  TSo perid  for
unifid  exanbel  rates  is  excludd  for  Chile.
tiguree  in  paroetbooe  are  t-.tatiatica
lUlL,  Alit?!
flU  Deprcdation  In  the  parallel  rate.  AIMt"
AlL  eotletion  Usaing  intruenntal  vartAble.  Inat  omete  are lagged  DOB  and laggd  or  current  rate  of  cbane  of  M2 (MI  for
Argntin).significant.  In  most  cases  the  size  of the  coefficient  exceeds  0.70  or  is  close
to  it. Somewhat  smaller  coefficients  are  obtained  for  Chile(0.44),  Ghana(0.47),
Tanzania(0.59)  and  Zambia  (0.31). In  the  last  three  countries  one  should  expect
that  the  estimated  coefficient  will  underestimate  the  true  coefficient  due  to  the
imposition  of extensive  price  controls. The official  CPI  was used to estimate
inflation  in  all cases.  For these  countries,  this  procedure  would understate
thelevel  of actual  inflation.  From  the  results,  it  is  possible  to say  that  the
dual exchange rate system arrangements  provides  very little insulation  to
domestic  prices. The largest  coefficient  we obtain  is for  Peru at 0.98,  which
would  indicate  that  the  DER  provides  no insulation  whatsoever.
Given  that  most  coefficients  we obtained  are  less  than  1,  this  could  be taken  as
an indication  that the  DER system  provides  some insulation  in the short  run.
This  interpretation,  however,  in some  cases  will  be misleading  for  two  reasons.
First, flexible  exchange rates typically adjust faster than prices, thus
suggesting  that  even  if  the  effect  were large,  this  might  take  several  quarters
to be fully  reflected  in domestic  prices. Second,  because  over  time  there  are
changes  in the prices  of tradeables  to nontradeables,  one would expect  some
changes  in  the  exchange  rate  not  to  be  accompanied  by  proportional  changes  in
domestic  prices.  In  summary,  the  empirical  evidence  indicates  that  the  DER
system  provides  partial  insulation  on  domestic  prices.
V.  Summary and  Conclusions
This  paper  examined  and  tested  some  macroeconomic  implications  of  multiple
exchange  rates  arrangements  for  a  large  sample  of  developing  countries.  We
tested  the  influence  of certain  macroeconomic  fundamentals  (  the  money  supply,
the  stock  of international  reserves  and  the  real  exchange  rate)  on the  behavior
of the  parallel  premium. We also  tested  the  hypothesis  that  a DER arrangement
provides  insulation  to  domestic  prices  by enabling  the  authorities  to postpone
a  maxi-devaluation  which  could  be  inflationary.  The  countries  in  the  sample  were
classified  either  as high  premium  (if  mean annual  premium  exceeded  35 percent)
or  moderate  premium  (if  mean  annual  premium  was between  10  and  35  percent). We
expected  the relationship  between  the parallel  premium and the  macroeconomicfundamentals  to  be  empirically  stronger  for  high  premium  countries  relative  to
moderate  premium  countries.
Overall,  we find  remarkably  similar  results  for  the  factors  that  determine  the
behavior  of the  parallel  premium  across  a wide  cross-section  of developing
countries,  with substantial  differences  in the nature  and duration  of DER
arrangements  as  well  as the  size  of  the  parallel  market  and  the  level  of  the
parallel  premium. For countries  with  very high  premia,  the  macroeconomic
fundamentals  are extremely  important  in determining  the parallel  premium.
However,  we  find  evidence  to  support  the  importance  of  portfolio  factors  for  the
short  runibehavior  of  the  premium  even  in  moderate  premium  countries.  From  the
panel  estimation,  it is clear  that  whether  the  DER is official  or not is
irrelevant  to  the  determination  of  the  parallel  premium.  Restrictions  on  the
capital  account  are  important  in  determining  the  level  of  the  parallel  premium,
but  restrictions  on  payments  on  the  current  account  are  not.  This  is  consistent
with  the  observation  that  a  parallel  market  in  foreign  exchange  has  not  emerged
in  the  CIA  zone  countries,  where  restrictions  on  trade  exist  but  there  are  no
restrictions  on  capital  account  transactions.
Dual exchange  rate systems,,  at best, provide  partial insulation  to domestic
prices.  The  extent  of  insulation  diminishes  as  the  authorities  use  the  level  of
the  parallel  premium  to  determine  the  timing  of  devaluation  of  the  commercial
(official)  exchange  rate. Effectiveness  of  the  dual  exchange  rate  system  in
terms  of insulation  of  domestic  prices  decreases  as  leakages  between  the  two
markets  become  more  extensive.Referencos:
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Development  Economics,  Vol.  37,  pp. 155-172.Appendix  Table  1:  PARALLEL  MARKET  PREMIUM  (PERIOD  AVERAGE)
COUNTRY  1970-1989  1970-1979  1980-1989  TREND
Algeria  199.93  74.47  324.78  26.24
Egypt  96.77  77.36  116.19  67.51
Ethiopia  83.36  50.33  116.38  47.18
Ghana  437.05  179.68  697.40  142.14
Malawi  52.47  56.45  49.04  34.40
Nigeria  93.90  34.81  152.99  24.30
Sudan  99.54  85.13  113.96  66.23
Tanzania  150.65  102.22  199.08  73.02
Zaire  95.14  136.14  54.14  32.03
Zambia  92.66  1  6.47  78.85  57.45
Argentina  62.54  85.40  39.68  21.93
Bolivia  43.79  21.26  66.33  9.77
Brazil  37.91  17.89  57.93  19.73
Chile  104.41  191.13  17.69  12.94
Dominican  Republic  41.43  28.50  54.36  24.69
Ecuador  25.36  7.26  43.46  13.05
Mexico  10.46  0.84  20.08  7.55
Peru  64.l00  54.67  82.33  10.73
Venezuela  43.06  0.54  85.58  1.94
NOTES:
Source:  IFS  tapes,  World  Currency  Yearbook,  Pick's  currency  Yearbook,
Currency  Alert,  various  issues
Premium  - (Parallel  Exchange  Rate/  Official  Exchange  Rate)  - 1
Premium  is expressed  as a percentage.
TREND:  average  for 1970-1989,  excluding  episodes  with a.bove  trend
premium.Appendix  Table  2:  SAMPLE  FOR QUARTERLY
ESTIMATION
Number  Country
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